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Abstract
In this paper the corporate investment decision under financial restrictions is investigated
with Belgian firm data from 1984 to 1992. An investment Euler equation is derived from a
dynamic optimization model with debt ceilings and an elastic credit supply. The model is
estimated by GMM for different firm groups. An important aspect is that the sample is split
according to a firm’s association with coordination centers. These centers have become the
major external funding source of corporate investment in Belgium since 1986. The estima-
tion results show the dependence of corporate investment on financial factors, both for
non-coordination center as well as coordination center firms. Q 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.
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1. Introduction
 .Under the Modigliani and Miller 1958 conditions a firm’s capital structure does
not affect the firm’s market value. In actual capital and credit markets the
 .conditions imposed by Modigliani and Miller 1958 do not hold, debt finance is an
important source of external funds, and the relation between debt and equity
U Corresponding author.
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finance seems important. Aspects in economies that do not satisfy the assumptions
made by Modigliani-Miller concern the tax structures, costs of bankruptcy, differ-
ential borrowing rates, monitoring costs required to minimize risks and asymmetric
information.
Recent developments in the literature on imperfect information in capital
markets show that a firm’s capital structure is chosen such that inefficiencies in a
 .firm’s investment decisions are mitigated, e.g. Myers and Majluf 1984 . An
important feature is the existence of asymmetric information. Entrepreneurs are
assumed to have more information about the investment process, like the probabil-
ity distribution of outcomes, than the lenders of funds. This generates a conflict of
interests, like in the traditional agency problem, which either generates a wedge
between the price of internal and external funds or eliminates sources of finance.
The cost and ability to invest depend thus on the financial position, in particular on
 .the internal net worth e.g. Leland and Pyle, 1977 .
If credit market imperfections limit a firm’s access to external finance or make it
more expensive, firm’s liquidity and internally generated cash-flow can determine
its actual capital investment. On the one hand, firms may prefer to finance
 .investment by internally generated funds to low-risk debt and to equities. This is
known as the ‘pecking order’ theory of finance, in which ‘the firms prefer internal
 .to external financing, and debt to equity if it issues securities’ Myers, 1984, p. 576 .
On the other hand, a greater value of internal worth can reduce the likelihood of
 .being rationed or increase the loan size . This is the case if banks do not use the
 .  .interest rate as the only rationing vehicle, but also other characteristic s of the
loan contract or loan customer such as risk characteristics of the customer,
collateral, money put in the project by the customer, etc.
Financial patterns can vary across firms according to the differences in the
 .incentive-induced costs they face in obtaining external finance. Firms subject to
capital market frictions are more likely to rely on retained earnings and bank debt,
than on direct credit. Investment decisions will thus be sensitive to fluctuations in
internal net worth for this type of firm. Investigating financial effects on invest-
ment under capital market imperfections requires hence a focus on the investment
behaviour of groups of firms with different financial characteristics.
In recent literature many empirical studies on investment behaviour have
investigated the influence of the financial structure on investment decisions.
Investment behaviour of groups of firms with different financial characteristics
have been analyzed. Different criteria to obtain the more and less likely financially
constrained groups, like dividend policy payment, maturity, bond ratings and size,
have been used to split the firm samples. In Table 1 some panel studies are
summarized. The groups that are found to be most constrained in each study are
mentioned in the last column.
Despite the difference in degree of development of financial markets in the
countries and in sample periods, one important conclusion of all these studies is
that investment depends on financial positions, in particular for specific groups.
Like the studies mentioned in Table 1, this study concentrates on dynamic
investment decisions under uncertainty and financial constraints. An investment
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Table 1
Investment panel studies with financial constraints
Authors Country Period No. of Finding: investment is more
firms constrained for firms that . . .
 .Fazzari et al. 1988 US 70]84 422 are young and pay low-dividend
 .Whited 1992 US 72]86 325 do not have bond ratings
 .Bond and Meghir 1994 UK 71]86 626 pay low or no dividends
 .Estrada and Valles 1995 Spain 83]92 1508 are ‘small’ andror young´
 .Van Ees et al. 1996 Netherlands 83]92 427 have low-payouts
 .Barran unpublished Belgium 84]92 436 are not associated with a CC
Euler equation is derived from a dynamic optimization problem with debt ceilings
and an elastic credit supply. The model is estimated by GMM with a Belgian panel
data set of 1984]1992 that is for the first time used for this purpose.
A particular aspect in this study is the focus on coordination centers. Coordina-
tion centers were created in Belgium in 1982 to attract foreign investors and
stimulate domestic investment. These coordination centers have as an important
role the channelling of funds among firms within a center. This group relationship
is likely to mitigate the asymmetric information problems and can consequently
facilitate external funds for a firm associated with a coordination center a
.CC-firm, for short in comparison with a non-CC firm. Coordination centers in
Belgium thus render similar services to member firms as keiretsu’s in Japan see
.for instance Hoshi et al., 1991 .
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we investigate whether Belgian corporate
investment is affected by its liquidity and internally generated cash-flows. Second,
we investigate whether coordination centers mitigate the asymmetric information
problems and thus reduce the sensitivity of investment to liquidity, cash flows and
debt positions of member firms.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Sec. 2 the econometric model is
specified, its model solution is derived and the testing for financial restrictions is
explained. In Sec. 3 GMM results are presented. In Sec. 4 some background
information and descriptive statistics on the coordination centers in Belgium is
given. In Sec. 5 GMM results for CC firms and non-CC firms are presented. Sec. 6
summarizes and concludes.
2. The model
In the first subsection a model is specified. The model is a neoclassical invest-
 .ment model where financial constraints are included, similar to Whited 1992 ,
 .  .Hubbard et al. 1995 , and Bond and Meghir 1994 . In the second and third
subsection the model solution and the method of testing for the financial restric-
tions are presented.
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2.1. The model specification
Managers are assumed to maximize the market value of the firm. This criterium
function is specified as
` ty1
 .  .max E b d y S . 1 0 i , s i ,t i ,t
` 4K , N , B ss0i ,t i ,t i ,t ts0 ts0
E is the rational expectations sign where the information set contains the0
 .information until period 0, t a time index, b ' 1r 1 q u where u is thei ,s i ,s i ,s
nominal discount rate at the end of period s and d the after tax dividends at timei ,t
period t. S is the value of new shares issued at time t. d is parameterized asi ,t i ,t
 . w  .  . xd s 1 y t F K ,N y W N y C I ,K y r Bi ,t i ,ty1 i ,t t i ,t i ,t i ,ty1 i ,ty1 i ,ty1
 « . I  .q B y 1 y p B y P I q S 2i ,t t i ,ty1 s ,t i ,t i ,t
where
t s the corporate income tax rate;
K s the capital stock of firm i at t;i ,t
I s gross investment of firm i at time t;i ,t
N s vector of variable factor inputs by firm i at t;i ,t
 .B s the amount of long and short term real debt of firm i at t;i ,t
W s vector of real factor prices of firm i at t;t
r s the interest rate paid on debt at time t;i ,t
P I s the real sectoral investment price at time t;s,t
p « s the inflation, measured as the product price change at time t.t
 .  .  .In 2 F . is the production function and C . the adjustment cost function. The
production function is a function of capital at period t y 1 and variable factor
inputs at period t. For capital stock it takes thus one period to become productive.
The production function is assumed to be concave and to satisfy further Inada
assumptions. The adjustment cost function is assumed to be convex. It is thus costly
to change the capital stock quickly.
Capital stock accumulates according to the standard capital accumulation rule,
i.e.
 .  .  .K s I q 1 y d K m I s K q d y 1 K , 3i ,t i ,t i ,ty1 i ,t i ,t i ,ty1
where d represents the constant economic depreciation rate.
 .  .In addition to the equality restrictions 2 and 3 a non-negativity restriction on
dividends must hold. This is guaranteed by
 .d G 0, 4i ,t
and will be associated with the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier l .Furthermore, ai ,t
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transversality condition is to be imposed on debt as
Ty1
 .lim b B s 0. 5 i , s i ,T
Tª` ss0
This restriction excludes the possibility to borrow money, in order to pay
dividends, at the end of the time horizon.
The existence of credit market imperfections can constrain firms financially,
either by means of credit rationing or by increases in the cost of debt. Because
these two regimes can exist simultaneously for different firms or at different times
 .for the same firm, we specify both. First, following Whited 1992 we assume that
firms have a debt ceiling BU . This is specified asi ,t
)  .B F B , 6i ,t i ,t
where BU is the maximum amount that the firm can borrow at time t. Thisi ,t
constraint will be associated with the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier g in the modeli ,t
solution in the next section.
 .  .Second, as in Bond and Meghir 1994 and Estrada and Valles 1995 we assume´
that each firm faces an elastic credit supply curve that is known to the firm. This
curve can be specified as
 .  .r s r q V B ,K ,F , 7i ,t f ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t
 . .where r is the risk-free interest rate and V G 0 is a function that is to bef ,t
specified further.
2.2. The model solution
 .  .  .  .  .The criterium function 1 is maximized subject to restrictions 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
 .  .  .6 , and 7 . As is common in these kind of models, the restriction 5 will be
 .  .disregarded. The expressions for d and I given by 2 and 3 , respectively, arei, t i ,t
 .thereafter substituted in the criterium function 1 .
The Euler equations are then found by taking the derivative of the criterium
function with respect to N , K and B . They are given byi ,t i ,t i ,t
 .  .F K ,N s W 8N i ,ty1 i ,t t
1 q li ,tq1 w  .  .E b F K ,N y C K , It i ,t K i ,t i ,tq1 K i ,t i ,tq11 q li ,t
P Is ,tq1 .  .q 1 y d C K , I qI i ,t i ,tq1 /1 y t
­ r P Ii ,t s ,t .  .x4y B s C K , I q 9i ,t I i ,ty1 i ,t­ K 1 y ti ,t
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­ ri ,t « .  .b 1 q 1 y t r q B y p E 1 q l q g s 1 q l .i ,t i ,t i ,t tq1 t i ,tq1 i ,t i ,t /­ Bi ,t
 .10
 .  .C . and C . are the first derivative of the adjustment cost function withI K
respect to the first and the second argument, respectively.
 .From 10 it follows that
1 y L 1 q l gi ,t i ,t i ,t
b where L 'i ,t i ,t 4­ r 1 q E l 1 q li ,t t i ,tq1 i ,t« .1 q 1 y t r q B y pi ,t i ,t tq1 /­ Bi ,t
 .11
Notice that if the assumption of risk neutrality and perfect capital markets holds,
i.e. the required return on equity equals the after tax return on debt,
­ ri ,t « .u s 1 y t r q B y p mi ,t i ,t i ,t tq1 /­ Bi ,t
1
b si ,t ­ ri ,t « .1 q 1 y t r q B y pi ,t i ,t tq1 /­ Bi ,t
 .12
 .since b ' 1r 1 q u . Then notice that this expression equals the expression fori, t i ,t
 .  411 where g s l s E l s 0.i ,t i ,t t i,tq1
 .  .Substituting 11 in 9 reduces the first order condition of capital to
P Is ,tq1)   .  .  .  .b F K ,N y C K , I q 1 y d C K , I qi ,t K i ,t i ,tq1 K i ,t i ,tq1 I i ,t i ,tq1 /1 y t
­ r P Ii ,t s ,t .4y y C K , I y s «I i ,ty1 i ,t i ,tq1­ K 1 y ti ,t
1 y L i ,t)where b 'i ,t ­ ri ,t « .1 q 1 y t r q B y pi ,t i ,t tq1 /­ Bi ,t
 .13
 .The unobserved terms in 13 are substituted by their realisations by which an
error term, « with mean zero and uncorrelated with the information seti,tq1
available to the firm at time t, is added to the Euler equation. Note that if L isi,t
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set equal to zero, the error term contains
 .  .  .yL F K ,N y C K , I q 1 y di ,t K i ,t i ,tq1 K i ,t i ,tq1
P I ­ rs ,tq1 i ,t .  .= C K I q y B 14I i ,t i ,tq1 i ,t 5 /I y t ­ Ki ,t
 4Under perfect capital markets this is not a problem since g s l s E li,t i,t t i,tq1
s 0. Thus, using financial variables as instruments in the estimations is valid since
they are uncorrelated with the disturbance term « . However, if financiali,tq1
markets are not perfect, L will be different from zero and the financial variablesi,t
cannot be used as instruments since they would be correlated with the residuals.1 If
the financial markets are not perfect, fixed investment and financial positions are
not independent.
 .  .In order to estimate 13 we have to parameterize F K ,N andK i,t i,tq1
 .C K , I . Under the assumption of linear homogeneity of the productioni,ty1 i,t
function the equality
 .  .  .  .F K ,N s F K ,N K q F K ,N N 15i ,ty1 i ,t K i ,ty1 i ,t i ,ty1 N i ,ty1 i ,t i ,t
holds. In this expression F and F are the marginal productivity of capital atK N
 .  .period t y 1 and labour at t, respectively. Rewriting 15 and substituting 8 gives
 .F K ,N y mW Ni ,ty1 i ,t t i ,t .  .F K ,N s 16K i ,ty1 i ,t K i ,ty1
 .where m s 1. Like in Whited 1992 m is a parameter to be estimated in our
model. This allows us to estimate the existence of market power. If there is no
 .market power, m s 1 see also Whited, 1992 .
For the adjustment cost function the rather standard quadratic specification
2
a Ii ,t .  .C K , I s y c K 17i ,ty1 i ,t i ,ty1 /2 Ki ,ty1
was chosen. The constant c is a target value geared towards I rK . Thei,t i,ty1
derivatives of the adjustment cost function are then given by
Ii ,t .  .C K , I s a y c 18I i ,ty1 i ,t  /Ki ,ty1
2
a Ii ,t 2 .  .  .  .C K , I s y 1 y d C K , I y y c 19K i ,ty1 i ,t I i ,ty1 i ,t  /2 Ki ,ty1
1In the following section this is shown by the rejection of the test for overidentifying restrictions, i.e. the
Sargan test.
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 .  .  .  .Substituting 18 , 19 and 16 in 13 we get
2 .F K ,N y mW N a Ii ,t i ,tq1 i ,tq1 i ,tq1 i ,tq1) w  .b q q 1 y di ,t  /K 2 Ki ,t i ,t
I P I ­ ri ,tq1 s ,tq1 i ,t x= a q y Bi ,t /K 1 y t ­ Ki ,t i ,t
I P Ii ,t s ,t  .y a y q c q f q s s « 20i ,t i t i ,tq1K 1 y ti ,ty1
w  . . U x  .where c ' ac 1 y 1 y d q cr2 b and f is a fixed firm effect, s a timei,t i,t i t
effect and « the forecast error.i,tq1
2.3. Testing for the financial restrictions
As discussed previously, financial restrictions in intertemporal investment mod-
 .els have empirically been tested by means of i constraints on the level of debt
 .  .  .e.g. Whited, 1992 or ii by specifications on the cost of debt. In the econometric
 .model presented in the previous section both aspects are incorporated by 6 and
 .7 .
 .The degree of the debt level constraints is measured by g in 6 . Thisi,t
parameter is the shadow value of internal funds. If g s 0 the firm is noti,t
constrained. In this case L s 0 and b U equals the ‘traditional’ discount factor ifi,t i,t
 4additionally l s E l s 0. If a firm is debt constrained, g ) 0.i,t t i,tq1 i,t
 4Note also that l s E l s 0 does not necessarily mean that firms that payi,t t i,tq1
dividends are not debt-constrained. If the opportunity costs of cutting dividends is
higher than the shadow value of internal funds, dividends will be paid even if the
 .firm is debt-constrained see also Bond and Meghir, 1994 .
As the shadow values l andror g cannot be estimated directly, a specifica-i,t i,t
 .tion is needed. As in Whited 1992 , we assume that L depends on financiali,t
variables that measure the financial distress of the firm. We adopt the specification
2 2B B r B r Bi ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t
L s c q c q c q ci ,t 1 2 3 4 /  /  /  /L L r B q CF r B q CFi ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t
2B y F B y Fi ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t L  .q c q c q « 215 6 i ,t /  /K Ki ,t i ,t
B r Bi ,t i ,t i ,t
where is the debt to assets ratio, is the interest coverage
L r B q CFi ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t
measured as the interest expenses divided by the interest expenses plus cash flow
B y Fi ,t i ,t
and is the net debt defined as the debt minus financial assets divided by
Ki ,t
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 .the capital stock. The c where j s 1,2 . . . 6 are parameters to be estimated andj
« L represents a white noise disturbance.i,t
 .If c s c s 0 this specification equals the specification of Whited 1992 . Like5 6
in Whited’s study, we thus concentrate on L since l and g cannot bei,t i,t i,t
identified simultaneously. Notice that the larger L is, the more debt-constrainedi,t
at t the firm is.
The alternative approach to test for financial constraints, i.e. tests on the cost of
 .debt r , rely on the assumption of an elastic credit supply curve of financiali,t
 .  .institutions. Bond and Meghir 1994 and Estrada and Valles 1995 specify the´
 .individual interest rate as a linear function of the net debt to capital ratio, i.e.
B y Fi ,t i ,t  .r s r q b 22i ,t f ,t  /Ki ,t
 .where r is a riskless interest rate; b is a parameter to be estimated and assumedf ,t
to be positive. From an economic point of view this financial restriction is very
 .different from 21 . The entrepreneur of the model specified in the previous
 .section that takes an investment decision and faces 22 , accounts for the fact that
the firms individual interest rate is influenced by the choice of the capital stock and
debt level since the terms ­ r r­ K and ­ r r­ B appear in the model solution.i,t i,t i,t i,t
 .The same entrepreneur, though, does not take into account cost effects or future
 .debt restrictions by the specification 21 .
 .In the empirical analyses presented in the next section we unfortunately had to
 .assume b s 0. The reason is purely econometrical. Substituting 22 in the econo-
metrical model entails that the parameter b appears in the denominator of b U andi,t
 . Uin the part ­ r r­ K in 20 . As there is not much variation in b convergencei,t i,t i,t
 .problems are encountered when estimating b. If another individual interest
specification is taken in which, for instance, ­ r r­ K s 0, the parameter b is noti,t i,t
even identified at all. It has a tendency to go to infinity in order to minimize the
criterium function. For these reasons b s 0 is maintained in further analyses.
3. Estimation results with Belgian panel data 1984–1992
 .  .The model 20 is estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments GMM ,
 .see Hansen 1982 , with a balanced sample that contains 436 firms. The GMM-pro-
cedure of TSP is used. For each model a system of annual equations with cross
equation restrictions is estimated. The structural parameters are thus estimated
directly. The convergence tolerance is 0.001. Corrections for conditional het-
eroscedasticity are made and the Bartlett kernel is used to ascertain the positive
definiteness of the covariance matrix.
 .Before estimating the investment model 20 first differences are taken to
eliminate the fixed effect f . The disturbance is hence a first order moving averagei
 .and variables at least one period lagged are theoretically valid instruments.
Different sets of instruments are used to test for the choice of instruments. For
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Table 2
Tests on choice of instruments
Instruments Real D.f. Real and D.f.
variables financial
Variables
t y 1,t y 2,t y 3 . . . 64.2 60 123.1 123
 .  .0.33 0.48
t y 2,t y 3 . . . 43.1 42 77.3 87
 .  .0.43 0.76
Ut y 1 20.2 15 45.9 33
 .  .0.16 0.07
UUt y 2 21.7 12 31.4 27
 .  .0.04 0.26
Real instrumental variables used are Y rK , C rK , I rK . Financial instrumental vari-i,t i,ty1 i,t i,ty1 i,t i,ty1
 .ables used are CF rK , B rL , B y F rK . The figures are the Sargan statistics, calculated asi,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t
the number of observations multiplied by the optimum criterium value. Df are the degrees of freedom.
The figures in brackets are the P-values.
UU Significant at the 5% level, U significant at the 10% level.
 .these tests the model 20 is estimated disregarding financial decisions, i.e. g si,t
 4l s E l s ­ r r­ K s ­ r r­ B s 0. Sargan-statistics of the model withi,t t i,tq1 i,t i,t i,t i,t
different instrument sets are presented in Table 2.
The column ‘Real variables’ presents the Sargan or J-statistics where the
variables Y rK , C rK , I rK are used as instruments. In the first linei,t i,ty1 i,t i,ty1 i,t i,ty1
these variables are lagged once, twice . . . etc. according to Arellano and Bond
 .  .1991 . The equation of 1987 in first differences is thus instrumented with the
 .variables of 1985, the equation of 1988 in first differences with instruments of
 .1985]1986, . . . and the equation of 1992 in first differences with variables of
1985]1990. In the second line variables lagged twice, lagged three periods . . . etc.
are taken, whereas in the third and fourth line only variables lagged once and
lagged twice are taken, respectively. In the column ‘Real and financial variables’
 .the financial variables CF rK , B rL , B y F rK are included additio-i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t
nally.
We first test the validity of instruments at t y 1. The Sargan statistic of the
model with instruments t y 1, t y 2, t y 3 . . . is neither rejected at the 30% level
for the set with real variables nor for the set with both real and financial variables.
A comparison of the parameter estimates } not presented here } shows that
there are no significant differences between using the set t y 1, t y 2, t y 3 . . .
and the set t y 2, t y 3 . . . . This allows us to continue with instruments that are
lagged once.
As we want to know whether it is important to include instruments that are
lagged more than one period, we test the set t y 1, t y 2, t y 3 . . . against the set
 .with only t y 1 see line three . A comparison renders 64.2 y 20.2 s 44.0 with
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60 y 15 s 45 degrees of freedom, a statistic that is accepted at the 50% level. This
implies that choosing the smallest set of instruments, i.e. t y 1, is not rejected
against the alternative. A similar comparison for the sets with real and financial
variables leads to the same conclusion. For this reason we will not use all available
moment conditions but continue with instruments lagged once see also Bond and
.Meghir, 1994 .
 .Further tests not shown here with instrumental variables differenced once, do
not render parameter estimates that are very different from the ones obtained
here. For this reason we continue with the instrument set t y 1 of real and
. 2financial variables in levels.
In order to verify the importance of financial factors in investment decisions by
Belgian firms the neoclassical investment model is estimated under the assumption
 .of perfect capital markets. The model 20 is thus estimated where L s 0. Reali,t
and financial variables are used } as in Table 2 } as instruments. If financial
markets are perfect indeed and the model is correctly specified, the test for
overidentifying restrictions must be accepted.
In the left part of Table 3 the GMM estimation results for the model without
financial constraints are given. The parameter estimate for m is highly significant
and, as predicted by the theory, close to one. The parameter a is significant also,
but in contradiction to the theory on convex adjustment costs, negative. The Sargan
statistic of this model is rejected at the 6% level. This can indicate that the
financial variables are important and correlate significantly with the error terms
here.
In the right part of Table 3 the GMM results are given for the model where li,t
 .is specified as in 21 . The six parameters c where j s 1,2 . . . 6 are estimatedj
without causing any convergence or identification problems. These results show
that the variable debt to liabilities is important since the parameters c and c are1 2
highly significant. The coverage and net debt to capital ratio seem less important.
The mark-up m is higher than in model 1 and the adjustment cost parameter is no
longer significant.
The Sargan test shows further that the model is accepted at the 28% level. In
comparison with the model without financial constraints, this second model with
financial constraints thus performs better. Tests on the financial variables further
show that the variable debt to liabilities is most important. The hypothesis H :01
c s c s 0 that is tested with a Wald test } with two degrees of freedom } has a1 2
test statistic 18.2. This hypothesis is thus rejected. Similar tests for the other two
financial variables, shown in the bottom part of column four are accepted.
2An important aspect of the model with t y 1 instruments is that it is accepted at the 10% level when
only real variables are used, while it is rejected when real and financial variables are used. This can
indicate that the financial variables are correlated with the error term possibly due to the ommission of
  ..financial variables in the model here see also the comments under 13 . This result was a.o. confirmed
 .in Estrada and Valles 1995 , Table 1.´
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Table 3
GMM estimation results investment Euler equation
Parameters Model 1: no Model 2:
financial constraints financial constraints
Total sample Total sample
UU UUm 1.04 1.08
w x  .  .Mark-up 165.8 134.1
UUa y0.02 0.004
w x  .  .Adjustment costs y2.0 0.2
c 6.051
Bi,t  .3.8
Li,t
UUc y9.342
Bi,t 2  .y3.1
Li,t
c 0.083
r Bi,t i,t  .0.6
r B q CFi,t i,t i,t
c 0.024
r Bi,t i,t 2  .1.2 /r B q CFi,t i,t i,t
c y0.015
B y Fi,t i,t  .y0.8
Ki,t
c y0.006
B y Fi,t i,t 2  .y0.8 /Ki,t
USargan statistic 45.7 29.6
 .  .P-¨alue 0.05 0.28
No. of firms 436 436
UUH : c s c s 0 18.201 1 2
H : c s c s 0 1.502 3 4
H : c s c s 0 0.903 5 6
The total sample consists of 436 firms, i.e. 3924 observations. The figures in brackets are t-statistics. The
 .  .parameter estimates for six time and three sector dummies are not presented. The degrees of
freedom for the Sargan statistic of model 1 and 2 are 32 and 26, respectively. The number of degrees of
freedom for the tests H ]H is 2. Instruments used are C rK , I rK , CF rK , B y01 03 i,t i,ty1 i,t i,ty1 i,t i,t i,t
.F rK , all lagged once.i,t i,t
UU Significant at the 5% level, U significant at the 10% level.
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According to these findings, the level of debt to liabilities thus constrains firms
more than their coverage or net debt to capital.
4. Coordination centers in Belgium
In this section some background information of coordination centers is given.
Furthermore, descriptive statistics of CC firms are compared with those of non-CC
firms.
4.1. Background
In 1982 coordination centers were created in Belgium with the objective to
attract foreign firms and to boost investment. They are regional headquarters of
multinational firms playing a role of intermediary between the mother company in
the original country and her daughters in a particular region.3 Their main activity
is to coordinate and to support the activities of all firms that belong to the group.
Coordination centers provide non-financial and financial services. Non-financial
services consist of advertising, the diffusion of information, research and develop-
ment, computer assistance and centralizing accounting and administrative activi-
ties. Financial services consist of insuring, exchange rate heading and centralizing
financial operations. In practice, the latter service implies handling and channelling
financial flows within a group. It also permits to raise funds from external financial
institutions to the benefit of the group.
Coordination centers render thus scale effects. The major advantages, though,
are fiscal. One advantage is obtained by exonerating tax payments on interest
earnings on bank deposits as well as dividends and interest charges. A second
advantage results from the calculation of the taxable sum. The ‘cost-plus’ method is
used, implying the calculation of the taxable sum as a percentage of the costs
where the costs do not include depreciation allowances, wages and financial
charges.
A coordination center can only work in favour of those firms that are members
 .of the group. Each firm of a group is linked directly or indirectly by either a
participation of at least 20% of the capital stock or 20% voting rights. To create a
 .  . coordination center a firm s must satisfy certain requisites. The firm s must be a
.member of a multinational group, have a minimum amount of cash flow and
revenues and a minimum number of workers.
In Table 4 the importance of the coordination centers in the Belgian economy is
shown. In 1986 23% of all financial means in the manufacturing industry were
obtained by means of coordination centers. This figure is 46% in 1994. The finance
of investment by means of coordination centers has thus doubled in 9 years.4
3A region is defined here in a broad sense, for instance it can be Europe.
4  .More statistics on coordination centers can be found in Tychon 1995 and Banque Nationale de
 .Belgique 1994 .
( )F. Barran, M. Peeters r Economic Modelling 15 1998 67]8980
Table 4
Investment in the manufacturing industry
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
 .Financial means in % from CC 23 36 39 48 54 47 32 43 46
 .Source: Banque Nationale de Belgique 1994 . Tableau 4.
Table 5
Averages of variables and ratios
Unbalanced Balanced
Total Total CC Non-CC Largest
non-CC
 .Operating income Y 1495 1879 10 605 997 4732i,t
 .Capital stock K 267 345 2115 167 1015i,t
 .Persons employed Em 329 390 1887 239 998i,t
 .Factors costs N W 1401 1781 10 029 948 4469i,t t
 .Debt B 278 331 2225 139 802i,t
s .Short term debt B 81 84 403 52 216i,t
 .Total liabilities L 1161 1332 8153 643 3208i,t
 .Financial assets F 246 240 2048 57 296i,t
 .Dividends D 22 20 115 10 50i,t
 .Cash flow CF 137 148 883 74 416i,t
 .Investment I 91 105 554 60 399i,t
 .Debt charges r B 30 36 226 16 87i,t i,t
Y rK 5.60 5.45 5.01 5.97 4.66i,t i,t
Em rK 5.25 5.16 4.74 5.68 4.40i,t i,t
B rK 1.04 0.96 1.05 0.83 0.79i,t i,t
F rK 0.92 0.70 0.97 0.34 0.29i,t i,t
CF rK 0.51 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.41i,t i,t
I rK 0.34 0.30 0.26 0.36 0.39i,t i,t
B rL 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.22 0.25i,t i,t
 .r B r CF q r B 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.17i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t
No. of firms 946 436 40 396 40
All figures are in million Belgian Francs of 1980. The numbers are averages over the firms and the 9
years. CC-firms are those firms that are associated with a coordination center in 1992. The ‘largest
non-CC firms’ are selected on the basis of the volume of the capital stock.
4.2. Descripti¨e statistics with the panel data
In Table 5 sample averages of some variables and ratios are presented. The
column ‘Total’ under ‘Unbalanced’ contains statistics for the total unbalanced
sample that consists of 946 firms. The column ‘Total’ under ‘Balanced’ contains the
total balanced sample that consists of 436 firms. A comparison of these two
columns shows that the selected balanced sample is rather representative.
The column ‘CC firms’ concerns those firms of the balanced sample that are
associated with a coordination center in 1992. For our sample of 436 this concerns
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40 firms, i.e. 9%. In the column ‘non-CC firms’ 396 firms are considered that are
not members of a coordination center in 1992. Of those firms, 40 firms are selected
that have the highest level of capital results are quite similar when selecting on
.the basis of the number of workers employed . These 40 firms are considered in
the column ‘Largest non-CC firms’. The CC firms are evidently large firms. By
comparing these firms with the 40 largest non-CC firms we try to eliminate a
selection bias.
The upper part of the table presents the variables in levels. The statistics of
Table 5 show that the CC firms share of total investment is about 50%. This is
confirmed here by the fact that the capital investment by 40 CC firms equals about
the investment by the 396 non-CC firms. All other variables are also about 10 times
larger for the CC than for the non-CC firms. The fact that CC firms are very large
indeed is confirmed by their average capital stock that is more than twice the stock
 .of the 40 largest firms see the last column . This is also the case for all the other
variables with two remarkable exceptions: the level of debt and the level of
financial assets. The level of debt is almost 20 and three times larger than those of
the non-CC and the 40 largest non-CC firms, respectively The financial assets are
even 30 and seven times larger.
The lower part shows some ratios of interest. Both the ratio of debt to capital
stock as well as the coverage of the CC firms turn out to be larger than those of the
other two balanced groups. This may reflect that obtaining external finance is
 .easier for CC-firms see Sec. 2 . This can however also be a consequence of their
higher level of financial assets. As is clear from the F rK ratio financial assetsi,t i,t
are almost 100% of the capital stock of CC firms, while they are only 33% for the
non-CC firms. The ratio debt to financial assets is about 1, 2 and 3 for the CC, the
non-CC and the 40 largest non-CC firms, respectively, while the debt to liabilities
ratio is about 25% for all three groups. These facts reflect, once again, the more
important role of financial investments for CC firms than for non-CC firms.
 . In comparison with firm studies of the US see Whited, 1992 , the UK see Bond
.  .and Meghir, 1994 and Spain see Estrada and Valles, 1995 investment by Belgium´
 .firms is quite high. The investment to capital ratio for Belgium 1984]1992 is
 .  .three times this ratio for the UK 1974]1986 and Spain 1984]1992 and 1.5 times
 .this ratio in the US 1972]1986 . At least for the UK and the US some caution
holds, though, because much larger firms are considered.
To show the evolution over the sample period the variables used in the
econometric analyses are presented in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. The left graphs show the
yearly sample means and the right graphs the yearly standard deviation. The effects
of the recession at the beginning and at the end of the sample period are clearly
visible. The investment capital ratio, for example, is hump-shaped.
Furthermore, like Table 5, these graphs point out the importance of the financial
investment by firms. Despite the increase in the debt capital ratio during the
sample period, the net debt to capital ratio }where net debt is debt minus
financial assets } has sharply decreased. The net debt even becomes negative in
the beginning of the 1990s.
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Fig. 1. Sample means and standard deviations.
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Fig. 2. Sample means and standard deviations.
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Table 6
GMM estimation results investment Euler equation
Parameters Model 1: no financial constraints Model 2: financial constraints
Non-CC firms CC-firms Non-CC firms CC-firms
UU UU UU UUm 1.04 1.08 1.06 1.09
w x  .  .  .  .Mark-up 190.7 39.7 110.2 38.1
a y0.02 y0.04 y0.01 y0.11
w x  .  .  .  .Adjustment costs y1.6 y1.0 y0.4 y1.8
UU UUc 7.3 1.931
Bi,t  .  .4.6 2.6
Li,t
UUc y12.4 y1.52
Bi,t 2  .  .y3.4 y1.2
Li,t
c 0.09 0.083
r Bi,t i,t  .  .0.5 0.7
r B q CFi,t i,t i,t
c 0.02 y0.014
r Bi,t i,t 2  .  .1.6 y0.7 /r B q CFi,t i,t i,t
c 0.01 y0.005
B y Fi,t i,t  .  .0.7 y0.2
Ki,t
c 0.001 0.006
B y Fi,t i,t 2 UU .  .1.9 0.1 /Ki,t
U USargan statistic 45.3 38.8 24.0 29.6
 .  .  .  .P-value 0.06 0.05 0.57 0.28
No. of firms 396 40 396 40
UU UUH : c s c s 0 28.6 29.401 1 2
H : c s c s 0 2.5 0.602 3 4
H : c s c s 0 4.0 2.703 5 6
See Table 3.
5. Estimation results for CC firms and non-CC firms
 .For the group of non-CC firms as well as for the group of CC firms Eq. 20 has
been estimated. The estimation results are presented in Table 6, as they were
presented in Table 3.
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Fig. 3. Average L according to GMM results.i,t
The estimation results of model 1 are for both groups quite similar to the results
 .of the whole sample see Table 6 : the parameter estimate for m is highly
significant and close to one and the parameter a is significant but negative. The
Sargan statistic of the models are rejected at the 5% level. This indicates that the
financial variables might be important.
For the model applied to the CC firms sample one remark is to be made here.
This sample only consists of 40 observations. In order to reduce the dimension of
the covariance matrix in TSP, i.e. in order to correct for heteroscedasticity, for
 .each equation the same set of instruments of 1985 are taken instead of lagging
the instruments only once. For this reason the estimates here may be slightly more
 .efficient and possibly biased see Tauchen, 1986 .
In the right part of Table 6 the GMM results are given for the model where L i,t
 .is specified as in 21 . Like the results for the whole sample, the conclusions for
non-CC and CC firms leads also to the conclusions that the model is accepted at a
relatively high significance level and that debt to liabilities is the most important
financial variable. The markup-parameter for the non-CC firms is, though, 3%
higher for the CC-firms. Also the value of the financial parameters differ consider-
ably.
This is illustrated in Fig. 3. In this graph the fitted values of L for the threei,t
samples are illustrated. This graph shows that the average L is higher for thei,t
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Table 7
GMM estimation results investment Euler equation
Parameters Model 3: financial constraints and BC-effect
Non-CC firms CC-firms
UUc 0.40 y0.177
Bi,t  .  .s 2.31 y0.58t Li,t
Sargan statistic 20.2 28.9
 .  .P-value 0.73 0.27
No. of firms 396 40
See Table 3. As the results of the other parameter estimates do not differ much from those of model 2
in Table 6, they are not presented here.
non-CC firms than for the CC firms. Although the level of debt to liabilities is
important in the investment decision, both for non-CC as well as for CC-firms, this
ratio is higher for the former group of firms. According to these results CC firms
are thus less financially constrained than non-CC firms and have a higher level of
debt to liabilities in the CC firms sample than in the non-CC firms sample see
.Table 5 .
As a last experiment we investigate whether or not business cycle effects play a
 .  .significant role. Like in Hubbard et al. 1995 we include in the specification 21 a
Bi ,t
business cycle effect c s where c is the parameter to be estimated, s a risk7 t 7 tLi ,t
premium measured as the difference between the government bond yield and the
Bi ,t
prime lending rate, and the most significant financial factor that we have
Li ,t
found in our previous analyses. We expect that c is positive since an increase in7
 .the spread risk premium will have a positive effect on the financial restrictions
and hence constrain the firm when taking investment decisions. The main results
are presented in Table 7.
The results show that the business cycle effect is positive and strongly significant
for the group of non-CC firms whereas it is not significant for the group of CC
firms. This result indicates that investment by firms associated with a CC is less
affected by economic fluctuations than firms that have to rely on public financial
intermediaries to obtain external funds.
6. Summary and conclusions
In this paper a dynamic neoclassical model of investment is specified. This model
is extended with financial constraints, estimated with Belgian panel data and
further analyzed. The estimation results reject the standard neoclassical model
whereas the model with financial constraints is accepted. This result is according to
results obtained in other investment studies that test for the financial constraints.
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Financial factors thus turn out to have a significant influence on Belgian
investment decisions. But in Belgium coordination centers are said to be important
as a financial channel. To test whether this is empirically corroborated, the sample
is split into non-coordination and coordination center firms. According to the
estimation results the balance sheet position is important for both groups, but the
coordination center group turns out to be less financially constrained than the
non-coordination center group. Furthermore, it turns out that the former group is
less dependent on fluctuations in the risk premium over the business cycle. The
coordination center group is thus apparently less dependent on business cycle
effects although the statistics show that it has a higher debt to liabilities ratio than
the non-coordination center group.
These results corroborate the expectations that the close relationship between
coordination centers and member firms reduces informational problems, increases
the level of debt to liabilities and hence reduces the dependence on internally
 .generated funds. The group of firms that is related to coordination centers is still
not fully independent of their debt position but coordination centers seem to have
a significant effect on business investment indeed.
Acknowledgements
Research for this study was initiated when both authors worked at the Universite´
Catholique de Louvain at Louvain-La-Neuve in Belgium. The Department of
Economics of the Universite Catholique de Louvain is gratefully acknowledged for´
financial support. For helpful comments we want to thank Ronald Anderson, Leo
de Haan, Hugo Kruiniger, Elmer Sterken and Pierre Tychon. All errors are ours.
Appendix 1:
Data
In the first part of this data appendix the definition and construction of variables are
described. In the second part the selection criteria are summarized.
Definition and construction of variables
 .The variables below associated with a number in brackets are from the balance
sheet and the income statement of the National Belgian Bank. The number
indicates the balance sheet or income statement item.
The indi¨idual ¨ariables
 .  .v Operating income Y is turnover 70 plus variations in stocks of finishedi,t
 .  .goods, work and contracts in progress 71 plus fixed assets-own construction 72
 .plus other operating income 74 .
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 .  .  .v Cash flow CF is income 70r67 and 67r70 plus depreciation 630 .i,t
v Capital stock is the balance sheet value of capital stock. The real capital stock is
K nomi ,t nomcalculated as K ' where K is the balance sheet capital stocki,t i,tPi ,t
 .22]27 and P is the aggregate investment goods price.I,t
 .v Gross investment I is calculated with the capital accumulation rule. For thei,t
I nom Pi ,t I ,tnomreal investment it holds that I ' where I ' K y K qi,t i,t i,t i,ty1P PI ,t I ,ty1
 .capital depreciation 630 .
 .  .v Employment Em is the number of persons employed 9090 .i,t
 .v Real factor costs N W are the remunerations, social security costs and rawi,t t
 .  .materials and consumable purchases 60 , services and other goods 61 and
 .depreciation 630 .
 .  .v Assets or liabilities L are the balance sheet totals 20]58 .i,t
 .v Gross debt B is the sum of the financial debts payable within 1 yeari,t
 .  .170]174 and the financial debts payable after 1 year 43 .
 .  .v Financial assets F 28 comprise investment in affiliated enterprises, otheri,t
enterprises linked by participating interests and other financial assets.
 .  .v Dividends D 694 .i,t
All nominal variables were deflated using the sectoral product prices index.
The sectoral ¨ariable
PI ,t
v Real investment price P ' where P is the sectoral product price and Ps,t s,t I,tPs ,t
 .the investment goods price. These sectoral prices are taken from the Belgian
National Bank data base.
The aggregate ¨ariable
 .v Nominal interest rates r is the government bond yield from the Internationalf ,t
 .Financial Statistics 12461 ZF .
Selection criteria
The firms selected belong to the manufacturing industry. Three main sectors can
be distinguished: ‘chemical’, ‘metal’ and ‘other manufacturing industry’. Only those
 .  .  .firms are selected i that are public limited companies corporates , ii with more
 .  .than 20 employees, iii with a net value added of 20 000 BF, iv with total assets
 .  .equal or larger than zero, v with equity equal or larger than zero, vi with a
 .capital stock that does not increase with 500% within 1 year, vii with total
 .liabilities that do not increase with 5000% within 1 year and viii that exist for 9
years.
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